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"A FLAME OF FIRE": THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT IN PERILOUS TIMES
John M. Burkoff
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution
is, of course, one of the principal constitutional checks on any
governmental inclination to overreach in its otherwise lawful
and necessary crime-control and policing activity. What is
more, the Fourth Amendment was fully intended to-and it
actually does, at least to some modest if undeterminable
degree-prevent law enforcement agents and others acting on
their behalf from intruding unreasonably, without appropriate
justification and legal process, into the lives of Americans and
others living under our jurisdiction.
From this perspective, the Fourth Amendment is,
appropriately, an impediment to some of the most zealous of
law enforcement activities, and this is the case even when
that activity is entirely innocent and well-intentioned, where
the Government is acting strictly in an attempt to capture
criminals and/or to deter criminal activity. This is also the
case even when the result of the Fourth Amendment's
application is that some guilty persons end up going free. As
Justice Robert Jackson made this point for the Supreme Court
in 1948, more than half a century ago,
[ilt is said that if... arrests and searches cannot be made
[whenever criminal activity is thought to be present], law
enforcement will be more difficult and uncertain. But the
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forefathers, after consulting the lessons of history, designed
our Constitution to place obstacles in the way of a too
permeating police surveillance, which they seemed to think
was a greater danger to a free people than the escape of some
criminals from punishment.'
Indeed, Justice Jackson, a former Attorney General and
Solicitor General of the United States and a Supreme Court
justice, who left the Supreme Court for its entire 1945 Term in
order to serve by presidential appointment as Chief American
Prosecutor at the Nuremberg Tribunal to try captured senior
Nazi leaders for genocide and war crimes, had the following to
say, after returning from Nuremberg, about the importance of
Fourth Amendment freedoms to our American democracy:
These ...are not mere second-class rights but belong in
the catalog of indispensable freedoms. Among deprivations of
rights, none is so effective in cowing a population, crushing
the spirit of the individual and putting terror in every heart.
Uncontrolled search and seizure is one of the first and most
effective weapons in the arsenal of every arbitrary
government. And one need only briefly to have dwelt and
worked among a people possessed of many admirable
qualities but deprived of these rights to know that the human
personality deteriorates and dignity and self-reliance
disappear where homes, persons and possessions are subject
at any hour to unheralded search and seizure by the police.2
The Warrant Clause of the Fourth Amendment, in particular, serves this purpose of attempting to assure us that law
enforcement officers and agents will act reasonably, with appropriate antecedent justification and due legal process, before
intruding into our lives or the lives of our neighbors. It provides simply that "no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable
cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to

United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581, 595 (1948).
v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 180-81 (1949)

2 Brinegar

dissenting).

(Jackson, J.,
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be seized."3
The inclusion of this prohibitory language in the Fourth
Amendment, creating severe restrictions on law enforcement
behavior that are not found in most countries of the world,
was, of course, not simply historical happenstance. To be sure,
this is language that followed the English common law in existence at the time of the drafting of the Fourth Amendment and
the adoption of the Bill of Rights. But, more important still, it
is language that reflected-and continues to reflect, as Justice
Jackson pointed out--our country's express and profound constitutional commitment to individual freedom from unjustified
and unreasonable government searches and seizures.
The drafting and enactment of the Warrant Clause and the
Fourth Amendment itself followed as the direct result of critically important events that took place in the American colonies,
events that led to the Revolutionary War and to the birth of
the United States of America, and events that took place, significantly, in perilous times.
One of the most important of the specific triggering events
that led to the founding of our nation, forged out of the fires of
the American Revolution, and that led to our constitutionalized
commitment to individual rights and liberties took place more
than two hundred-fifty years ago, in 1761, in the Massachusetts Bay Colony. On October 25, 1760, the English sovereign,
King George II, died.4 Under English law applicable to the
American colonies at that time, the so-called "writs of assistance," used as general warrants by English customs officers in
the colonies, expired six months after the reigning King or
Queen died.5 As a result, the customs officers in the Massachusetts Bay Colony had only until April 25, 1761 to obtain new
writs of assistance, otherwise their power to execute such "general warrants" lapsed.6

U.S. CONST. amend. IV.

William J. Cuddihy, The Fourth Amendment: Origins and Original Meaning,
602-1791 763 (1990) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Claremont Graduate School)
(on file with UMI Dissertation Services).
Id.
6

Id.
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A general warrant is a search warrant that essentially
entitles its possessor to search whoever, wherever and whenever the possessor wants, without any necessity for a showing of
probable cause or any other sort of antecedent justification for
the search, without any particularized description of where the
possessor of the warrant intends to search or for what he or
she intends to search, without any judicial authorization or
supervision of the execution of the warrant whatsoever, and
without any right of refusal on the part of the individuals
whose bodies or homes or possessions are the target of the
warrant.7
The writs of assistance in colonial America were general
warrants.8 These writs were an adaptation of a form of general
warrant then in common use in England, tailored for use in the
American colonies principally to root out our forefathers' penchant for smuggling without paying the requisite steep and, in
the colonists' view, profoundly unfair English taxes and import
fees.9 These writs empowered their authorized enforcing
agents-usually, but not always, Customs officials in the colonies-to rummage through individuals' homes and offices and
possessions, searching whenever, wherever, and whomsoever
they desired. 10
Suffice it to say that these writs were hated and reviled by
the American colonists. Execution of these writs in the 1750s
and 1760s in an attempt to enforce what were perceived in the
Colonies to be profoundly unjust English trade laws resulted
in, to put it mildly, anger, resentment and hostility on the
colonists' part.1
But, as lawyers, would-be lawyers and judges, we all know
that there must be, inevitably, another side to the story. To the
English colonial authorities, the writs of assistance were
viewed as critical and essential law enforcement tools. 2 In
1755, the Colonial Governor of the Massachusetts Bay Colony

Id. at
Id. at
at
' Id.
at
10 Id.
" Id. at
1
Id. at
6

cii.
762-63.
762, 602-03.
762-63.
684-92, 721-46.
773.
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began the practice of issuing such writs of assistance to customs officers in an effort to seek to stem the torrent of smuggling by the colonists into the colonies from French Canada in
violation of the existing criminal laws of the time."3 Nothing
else seemed to work to deter this lawlessness. Remember, however benign (or even noble, romantic and swashbuckling) such
smuggling might appear today, viewed through the refracting
prism of the subsequent revolutionary events, at the time, this
was just plain criminal wrongdoing.
To deter such wrongdoing, five years prior to the time that
King George II died in 1760, the English colonial authorities
began a new and vigorous law enforcement campaign to stop
the smuggling into the Colonies from the French West Indies. "'4 The writs of assistance were deemed by the colonial
government to be an absolutely critical part of undertaking
that law-and-order campaign. 5 Indeed, if the campaign failed,
the threat to English sovereignty over the American Colonies
was viewed as being at risk. 6 With the benefit of hindsight,
we now know that the belief that a risk of revolution existed
was hardly a frivolous one.
When King George II died and the writs of assistance were
slated soon to expire, the Surveyor General of Customs in the
Massachusetts Bay Colony petitioned the Superior Court of the
Colony to issue, as he put it, in the "usual" fashion, new writs
of assistance for his use and for the use of his subordinate
officers. 7 A number of prominent merchants from the towns of
Boston and Salem, however, got together to oppose that "usual"
request, and, ultimately, the sides were drawn for a vigorous
court challenge to, and a corresponding defense of, the English
colonial authorities' use of the hated writs of assistance. s
Thus enter stage left, the young James Otis, Jr. These
merchants opposed to the writs on behalf of themselves and the

Id.
Id.

at 758.
at 763.

/d.
I'
16 Id.

at 773.

Id.

at 764.

"
14

"

/d.
IB
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other colonists hired Otis, then a mere thirty-five years old, to
argue their position in this pivotal case. 9 Born in 1725, Otis
had studied as a boy with the minister of his parish, and subsequently he attended Harvard College from 1739 to 1743, starting when he was only fourteen years old and graduating at the
ripe old age of eighteen ° . Otis then served as a legal apprentice in Boston for a number of years, finally beginning his own
legal practice in Plymouth in 1748 at the age of twentythree.2"
Having gained some prominence, Otis was also serving as
Acting Advocate General for the Massachusetts Bay Colony in
1760.22 But when he was asked to argue the writs of assistance case on the Colony's behalf as Advocate General, he not
only declined, he responded by stepping down from that
office.2 3 Subsequently, Otis agreed instead to argue the case
for the colonists in the same matter, the case against the writs
of assistance.24
James Otis took a lot of political and personal heat as a
result of this momentous decision.25 It is well to bear in mind
that what makes him appear heroic today, once again in the
flattering light of hindsight and a successful revolution, was
neither so self-evidently wise nor commendable to the entire
community in which he lived at the time. But Otis himself had
no doubts that he was doing precisely the right thing.26 In explaining his conduct for the public record, he declared to the
court hearing the writs of assistance case that

Id. at 765. It is unclear, parenthetically, what the actual name of this case
was. Id. at 766 n.26. Various contemporaneous accounts lead us to believe that it
was either Paxton's Case, Cockle's Case, or Petition of Lechmere. Id. The court
records relating to this matter have never been found, and "in a fit of the mental
disorder that overtook him in middle age [Otis] burnt all of his letters and papers he could lay his hands on." M. H. SMITH, THE WRITS OF ASSISTANCE CASE
312 (1978).
20 SMITH, supra note 19, at 312.
21 Id.

2
23
24

Id. at 315.
Id. at 316.
Id.

25 Id.
26

Id.
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I was sollicited [sic] to argue this cause as Advocate-General,
and because I would not, I have been charged with a desertion of my office; to this charge I can give a very sufficient
answer, I renounced that office, and I argue this cause from
the same principle; and I argue it with the greater pleasure
as it is in favour of British liberty .... And as it is in opposition to a kind of power, the exercise of which in former periods of English history, cost one King of England his head and
another his throne. I have taken more pains in this cause,
than I ever will take again: Although my engaging in this ...
has raised much resentment[,j . . . I think I can sincerely declare, that I cheerfully submit myself to every odious name
for conscience sake .... Let the consequences be what they
will, I am determined to proceed. The only principles of public
conduct that are worthy [ofi a gentleman ... are[] to sacrifice
estate, ease, health and applause, and even life itself to the
sacred calls of his country. These manly sentiments in private
life make the good citizen, in public life, the patriot and the
hero.27
Of course, subsequent events proved him right and the
argument that Otis made in this case has forever cast him as
both a patriot and a hero, indeed, one of the first truly American patriots and heroes. It is also worthy of note that, although
he was offered a large fee to argue the writs-of-assistance case,
Otis declined to receive any payment at all.2" Instead, he undertook the representation strictly on a pro bono basis.29 "[I]n
such a cause," he declared, "I despise a fee.""
The actual oral arguments in the writs of assistance case
were heard in the Superior Court of the Colony for three days
in February of 1761, and then again for one day in November
of that same year.3 The lawyers argued for and against the
renewed issuance of the writs of assistance on any number of
grounds: some statutory and some constitutional, some dry and

27

Id.

28

Id.

29

Id.

30 Id.
31

Id. at 233.
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technical and some eloquent and profound. However, it is the
eloquence and profundity of James Otis Jr.'s constitutional
arguments, with his dramatic appeals to notions of basic human rights and basic human entitlements, which struck a responsive chord in the colonies in 1761, and which cause him to
be remembered and honored still today as a result of these
events that took place in that case, argued more than two centuries ago.
Otis contended not only that the use of general warrants
was inherently an unjust and an unconstitutional practice, but
that such warrants were, moreover, in language subsequently
quoted and followed by the United States Supreme Court, "the
worst instrument of arbitrary power, the most destructive of
English liberty, and the fundamental principles of law, that
ever was found in an English law book ... ""
Execution of such writs, Otis added and the Supreme
Court has seconded, in oft-quoted language, placed "the liberty
of every man in the hands of every petty officer."3 Indeed,
Otis eloquently and forcefully continued:
[Olne of the most essential branches of English liberty, is the
freedom of one's house. A man's house is his castle; and while
he is quiet, he is as well guarded as a prince in his castle.-This writ, if it should be declared legal, would totally
annihilate this privilege. Custom house officers may enter our
houses when they please-we are commanded to permit their
entry-their menial servants may enter-may break locks,
bars and every thing in their way-and whether they break
through malice or revenge, no man, no court can inquire-bare suspicion without oath is sufficient.34
Even if the legislation creating writs of assistance had
been enacted properly, Otis concluded, "[n]o Acts of Parliament
can establish such a writ .... '[An Act against the [English]
Constitution is void: an Act against natural Equity is void.'"3"

32

Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 625 (1886) (quoting COOLEY'S CONSTI-

TUTIONAL LIMITATIONS 301-03).
33

Id.
SMITH, supra note 19, at 344.
I'
Id. at 364.
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Of course, to no one's surprise, James Otis lost these arguments.36 He failed in his attempt to stave off the renewal of
the writs of assistance. They were, in the event, renewed, and
their oppressive use, and the colonists' abhorrence of them,
continued. But, although Otis lost the battle, we ultimately won
the war, quite literally. The arguments made by Otis had a
dramatic, even a cataclysmic, effect on the colonies at the time
and, in due course, on the path of our history.
John Adams, then a twenty-six year-old spectator, watching from the gallery as James Otis argued his--our--case
against the writs of assistance, later recollected in his diary
that:
[Otis] was a flame of Fire! With the promptitude of Classical
Allusions, a depth of Research, a rapid Summary of Historical
Events and dates, a profusion of legal Authorities, a prophetic
glare ...

of his eyes into futurity, and a rapid Torrent of

impetuous Eloquence, he hurried away all before him; American Independence was then and there born. The seeds of Pa-

triots and Heroes to defend.., the vigorous Youth, were then
and there sown. Every man of an [immense] crowded Audience appeared to me to go away, as I did, ready to take up
Arms against Writts of Assistants [sic]. Then and there was
the first scene of the first Act of Opposition to the arbitrary
Claims of Great Britain. Then and there the child Independence was born. In fifteen years, i.e. in 1776, he grew up to
manhood, declared himself free.3

Adams's "flame of fire" reference to James Otis's oratory is,
parenthetically, somewhat ironic given the fact that Otis ultimately died as a result of being struck by lightning, a genuine
"flame of fire."38
These heated atmospherics notwithstanding, more than a

Cuddihy, supra note 4, at 798.
2 LEGAL PAPERS OF JOHN ADAMS 107 (L. Kinvin Wroth & Hiller B. Zobel
eds., 1965) (emphasis added); see also CHARLES FRANCIs ADAMS, THE LIFE AND
WORK OF JOHN ADAMS 276, 247-48 (Boston 1856), quoted in Boyd, 116 U.S. at
625; United States v. Parcel of Land, Bldgs., Appurtenances and Improvements,
Known as 92 Buena Vista Ave., Rumson, N.J., 507 U.S. 111, 119 n.10 (1993)
(plurality opinion); Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476, 481-82 (1965).
39 SMITH, supra note 19, at 497.
"

'7
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century after we won the American Revolution, the United
States Supreme Court, in Boyd v. United States, an important
1886 decision of the Court establishing constitutional limits on
the government's seizure of a person's papers, looked back upon
these historical developments and noted that
[t]he practice had obtained in the colonies of issuing writs of
assistance to the revenue officers, empowering them, in their
discretion, to search suspected places for smuggled goods,
which James Otis pronounced "the worst instrument of arbitrary power, the most destructive of English liberty, and the
fundamental principles of law, that ever was found in an
English law book;" since they placed "the liberty of every man
in the hands of every petty officer." This was in February,
1761, in Boston, and the famous debate in which it occurred
was perhaps the most prominent event which inaugurated the
resistance of the colonies to the oppressions of the mother
country. "Then and there," said John Adams, "then and there
was the first scene of the first act of opposition to the arbitrary claims of Great Britain. Then and there the child Independence was born." These things, and the events which took
place in England immediately following the argument about
writs of assistance in Boston, were fresh in the memories of
those who achieved our independence and established our
form of government. 9
Much more recently, Justice Scalia made this point once
again, more cogently and forthrightly, for the Supreme Court in
1989, acknowledging that "[tihe writs of assistance ... were

the principal grievance against which the Fourth Amendment
was directed."4 °
Indeed, even before he was appointed to the Supreme
Court, then New Hampshire Supreme Court Justice Souter had
observed in 1990 for that state court that,
[allthough litigation early in the reign of George III concentrated the opposition's scorn upon warrants to search for
merely incriminating papers or other "mere evidence," the

"' Boyd, 116 U.S. at 625; see also Brower v. County of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593,
596 (1989).
40 Brower, 489 U.S. at 596.
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characteristic American antagonism to the warrant practice of
the day condemned the excessive generality of non-returnable
authorizations to search any place for evidence of criminal
wrongdoing, as exemplified by the writs of assistance issued
to advance the enforcement of the revenue laws, and
anathematized by Otis ....
"'
Similarly, Chief Justice Rehnquist made clear for the Supreme Court in 1990 that
[tihe driving force behind the adoption of the [Fourth] Amendment,....

was widespread hostility among the former Colo-

nists to the issuance of writs of assistance empowering revenue officers to search suspected places for smuggled goods,
and general search warrants permitting the search of private
houses, often to uncover papers that might be used to convict
persons of libel. The available historical data show, therefore,
that the purpose of the Fourth Amendment was to protect the
people of the United States against arbitrary action by their
own Government ....4

The moral of this historical story is hardly obscure. The
Fourth Amendment was drafted in large part in direct and
reflexive response to the arbitrary and oppressive use of search
and seizure powers by the English government in the American
Colonies.
Indeed, one of the Constitution's draftsmen, Patrick Henry,
another American patriot and hero, felt so strongly about the
need for the new Constitution of the fledgling United States to
specifically address this subject that he urged his colleagues in
Virginia to reject the proposed new Constitution in the Virginia
ratification proceedings, inter alia, on the ground of the absence of such explicit individual protections against the use of
general warrants.43 Henry argued that unless and until such

express protection of individual rights against unreasonable
" State v. Tucker, 575 A.2d 810, 812 (1990) (citations omitted).
42 United States
v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 266 (1990)

(citations

omitted).
41 III THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION
OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 587 (Jonathan Elliott, ed., J.B. Lippincott Co.
1941) (1836).
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searches and seizures was constitutionally codified, "any man
may be seized, any property may be taken, in the most arbitrary manner, without any evidence or reason. Every thing the
most sacred may be searched and ransacked by the strong
hand of power."' Moreover, he added, "[wie have infinitely
more reason to dread general warrants here than they have in
England .... [Hiere a man living many hundreds [of] miles
from the judges may get in prison before he can get [a habeas
corpus] writ."4' 5
Virginia ratified the new Constitution of the United States
despite the objections of Patrick Henry and the many others
who shared his point of view.46 But it did so, as did some other ratifying states, while simultaneously insisting upon the
adoption of constitutional amendments which included detailed,
express, and strict search-and-seizure provisions, provisions
profoundly restricting the use of warrants.47 The drafting of
such a provision, now an essential part of our Bill of Rights,
which includes the Fourth Amendment and its Warrant
Clause, became, accordingly, the very first order of business of
the First Congress of the new United States. 8
So why have I belabored all of this constitutional history?
You probably knew all or most of this stuff, even if you did not
remember all of the names and all of the dates. You took, and
most of you (hopefully) passed, seventh grade civics. You heard
about the infamous "writs of assistance." You read about some
of the acts of opposition to them and to the unfair trade laws
they helped to enforce, events like the Boston Tea Party that
took place in Boston Harbor on December 16, 1773. Or, if you
did not remember any of these things specifically, at least you
must remember however vaguely, being taught something
about the reasons for the American Revolution.
But the reason to stress this history, the reason to pull you
back to some of your dim and probably scary middle-school

" Id. at 588.
45 Id.
46 DOUGLAS

(2d ed. 2004).
47 Id.
48

Id.

W. KNIEC, ET AL., INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS AND THE CONSTITUTION 29
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memories, is simply this: the significance of the foregoing
events relating to the founding of our country also relate, directly, forcefully, and importantly, to the resolution of contemporary questions concerning the significance and application of
Fourth Amendment search-and-seizure law.
We fought and we won a Revoluntionary War in large part
because of our forefathers' and foremothers' experience with,
and their anger about, the arbitrary and oppressive use of
general warrants. More than two hundred thousand Americans
fought in that War, and more than four thousand Americans
died in it.4 9 The resulting constitutional restrictions on unreasonable searches and seizures generally, and the use of warrants specifically, that are memorialized in our Fourth Amendment reflect therefore an important, indeed a critical and a
compelling, part of our history as a nation. These restrictions
continue to play a particularly important role in defining our
national identity and character and in guiding our interpretation of the meaning of our constitutional democracy.
This point, the importance of the Fourth Amendment to
our history and to our national identity and character, was,
perhaps, most compellingly made by Justice Felix Frankfurter.
In a 1950 dissenting opinion, objecting to the Supreme Court
majority's approval of the warrantless search of a small-time
criminal's office, files and papers, Justice Frankfurter eloquently observed that
[t]he old saw that hard cases make bad law has its basis
in experience. But petty cases are even more calculated to
make bad law. The impact of a sordid little case is apt to obscure the implications of the generalization to which the case
gives rise. Only thus can I account for [the majority's] disregard of the history embedded in the Fourth Amendment
and the great place which belongs to that Amendment in the
body of our liberties as recognized and applied by unanimous
decisions over a long stretch of the Court's history.
It is a fair summary of history to say that the safeguards
of liberty have frequently been forged in controversies involv-

4' U.S. Department of Veteran's Affairs, America's Wars (Oct. 2003), available
at http://wwwl.va.gov/pressrel/amwars.pdf.
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ing not very nice people. And so, while we are concerned here
with a shabby defrauder, we must deal with his case in the
context of what are really the great themes expressed by the
Fourth Amendment. A disregard of the historic materials
underlying the Amendment does not answer them.
It is true ... of journeys in the law that the place you
reach depends on the direction you are taking. And so, where
one comes out in a case depends on where one goes in. It
makes all the difference in the world whether one approaches
the Fourth Amendment as the Court approached it in [its
prior decisions on the importance of Fourth Amendment
protections] or one approaches it as a provision dealing with a
formality. It makes all the difference in the world whether one
recognizes the central fact about the Fourth Amendment,
namely, that it was a safeguard against recurrence of abuses
so deeply felt by the Colonies as to be one of the potent causes
of the Revolution, or one thinks of it as merely a requirement
for a piece of paper.50
The Fourth Amendment is important not only because it is
the law, and not only because it is a part of our Bill of Rights,
but it is also important because it is a vital part of our history,
our self-identity, our democracy, and our national culture.
Put another way, a more cynical way, perhaps, Americans-American judges, in particular-must not ignore the
important themes, liberties, and rights, both express and inherent, contained in our Fourth Amendment protections simply
in order to assure the conviction of "bad guys." Even if we know
(or assume that we know) that such accused persons are truly,
unquestionably, and without the slightest doubt, genuinely
"bad guys." Our Constitution, our Bill of Rights, our history,
our democratic character, and our national culture are simply
too important to us and to that which makes us proud to be

'o

United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 68-69 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dis-

senting) (emphasis added) (citations omitted); see also Groh v. Ramirez, 124 S. Ct.
1284, 1290 (2004) (quoting McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 455 (1948))

("We are not dealing with formalities."); United States v. Parcel of Land, Bldgs.,
Appurtenances and Improvements, Known as 92 Buena Vista Ave., Rumson, N.J.,
507 U.S. 111, 118-19 n.10 (1993) (plurality opinion) ("[Tihe misuse of the hated
general warrant is often cited as an important cause of the American Revolution.").
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Americans to permit us to ignore or, worse, to trivialize the important human rights themes contained in the Fourth
Amendment.
Of course, this argument is not very controversial. It is an
easy point to make, at least in the abstract. Everybody, surely
every American at least-Democrat or Republican, Liberal or
Conservative-is for human rights and liberties, for the Constitution, for the Bill of Rights, for Old Glory and all of the rest of
the American icons and virtues that we freely espouse (especially to others) and hold so dear, particularly when it does not
"cost us anything" to be for them.
But, what happens when there is a cost? And what happens when these costs are high? To answer this question, let us
drag Osama bin Laden out of his cave and put him on center
stage for a moment. Let us talk about Osama and about other
leaders and followers of Al Qaeda, and let us talk about their
friends, their supporters, their allies, and about all of the other
assorted poseurs, wannabes, groupies, copycats, riff-raff, and
hangers-on that surround or emulate them. To make this a
complete picture, we also need to consider the group of individuals that our government suspects might be involved in one or
more of these terrorism-related categories, but who are, in
actual fact, not terrorists or associated with terrorists at all:
the "false positives."
The important questions we need to ask and to answer, in
the perilous times in which we now live, is this: Does and
should and must the Fourth Amendment apply in the same
fashion not just to run-of-the-mill criminals, but also to terrorists and suspected terrorists, individuals who are committing or who have committed, or who may be poised to commit,
acts aimed at the destruction of extremely large numbers of
people?
For many, if not most Americans, the answer to this question of the scope of the Fourth Amendment's putative applicability to terrorists, and to suspected terrorists, is absolutely
clear and compelling. But, in my experience, there are two
entirely different, although still absolutely-clear-and-compelling,
answers to questions of this sort, both of which claim to be the
only "true" answer, and each of which is, seemingly, the polar
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opposite of the other. The two answers go something like this:
* Answer #1: Of course, the Fourth Amendment applies
to everyone (at least to every American or to any individual searched or seized on American soil) if they are suspected of any sort of crime, trivial or horrific. Remember the
words of Justice Frankfurter who said that "[iut makes all
the difference in the world whether one recognizes the
central fact about the Fourth Amendment, namely, that it
was a safeguard against recurrence of abuses so deeply felt
by the Colonies as to be one of the potent causes of the
Revolution."' Enough said.

and
a Answer #2: Idealism is great, but dead people do not
have the luxury of being idealistic. As Justice Jackson, a
real advocate of Fourth Amendment values, nonetheless
warned in a 1949 dissenting opinion, the Bill or Rights
should not be converted into a "suicide pact." 2 We cannot
allow terrorists to use our democratic strengths as weapons
against us and harm or defeat us because of our own inability to act. Enough said.
In truth, there is nothing new in recognizing that these
two competing points of view exist. As long ago as 1798, James
Madison wrote in a letter to Thomas Jefferson that "[plerhaps
it is a universal truth that the loss of liberty at home is to be
charged to provisions against danger, real or pretended, from
abroad."53 Thomas Jefferson, in contrast, himself authored a
letter in 1810, in which he warned that "[tlo lose our country

s, Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. at 69 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
52 Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 37 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissent-

ing); see also Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 160 (1963) ("[Wlhile
the Constitution protects against invasions of individual rights, it is not a suicide
pact.").
" PHILLIP B. HEYMANN, TERRORISM, FREEDOM, AND SECURITY: WINNING WITHOUT WAR xi (2003) (quoting letter of James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (May
13, 1778)).
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by a scrupulous adherence to written law would be to lose the
law itself, with life, liberty, property and all those who are
enjoying them with us; thus absurdly sacrificing the end to the
means."14 These are the same conflicting points of view that
we see evidenced so widely today.
How do we deal with such dramatically different points of
view? What does-what should-the Fourth Amendment and
the rest of the Bill of Rights mean in perilous times? In real
perilous times. In times when the threat to our nation, and to
our national identity and national security, are concrete and
imminent, not speculative or distant?
Ignoring for the moment the significant undertones of
political partisanship that questions of this sort carry-for
Democrats and Republicans, for Liberals and Conservatives-I
suggest that both of these pat and reflexive answers that I
have posed may be correct. At least I would like to argue that
they are correct in significant, if perhaps somewhat less rhetorical, ways.
I believe strongly and firmly that the Fourth Amendment
is more than just a simple legal interdiction; it is more than
just a sensible rule to be followed whenever it is convenient
and useful. Fourth Amendment protections and values are an
important part of our national fabric, and, as Justice Oliver
Wendell Holmes reminded us in 1920, we dare not tolerate
treating the express Fourth Amendment strictures as a mere
"form of words."5 5
Instead, I believe-I strongly believe-that the Fourth
Amendment is critically important to our country in many
important ways. The Supreme Court held in 1961, in its celebrated and seminal decision of Mapp v. Ohio, that if Fourth
Amendment protections are not fully enforceable, then that
constitutional provision is essentially
valueless and undeserving of mention in a perpetual charter
of inestimable human liberties,...

[and it is] so ephemeral

" Id. (quoting letter from Thomas Jefferson to John B. Colvin (Sept. 20,
1810)).
" Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 392 (1920).
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and so neatly severed from its conceptual nexus with the
freedom from all brutish means of coercing evidence as not to
as a freedom "implicit in the
merit this Court's high regard
56
concept of ordered liberty."
I fully agree.
I believe, in short, that the Fourth Amendment does, and
must, apply to everyone. Everyone. Whether they are terrorists
or prom queens. Or even, you never know, if they are terrorist
prom queens.
Moreover, it is absolutely clear that the Fourth Amendment was expressly intended to make it more difficult to fight
crime. Fighting crime, terrorism or not, would certainly be
easier, more convenient and more effective if no restraining
rules at all existed on American law enforcement agents; if law
enforcement agents today could once again use some form of
"super writs of assistance," searching whoever, whenever and
wherever they wanted; if they could seize whoever, whenever
and wherever they wanted; and if they could interrogate and
torture whoever for whatever length of time and in whatever
way that they wanted.
But we have been down that road before and it is the
wrong path. As Professor Philip Heymann of Harvard Law
School has recently warned, "[e]ven what is effective in protecting the safety of American citizens and their property may be
unwise because of its effects on the historic set of arrangements
which have preserved our democratic liberties."5 7 Frankly, I
have done work for our government in countries where, regardless of those countries' supposed laws, all of what I just described was commonplace. Where torture was a standard and
pervasive part of much law enforcement activity. Sadly, this
kind of horrible inhumanity happens. But, of course, our laws,
our Constitution, our history, our national character and identity, make that impossible. Impossible, lest we become something
that we are not: another country with another culture and
character, divorced from our history.5 8

"
'T
"

Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961).
HEYMANN, supra note 53, at 87.
This Lecture was delivered before the episodes of torture at Abu Ghraib
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With that said, and proudly and firmly said, I also believe,
I know, that the Bill of Rights does not and was never intended
to emasculate us. The Fourth Amendment was not intended,
and it should not be interpreted, to make it impossible to protect ourselves from the very real and substantial threat that we
face today from real terrorists and real terrorist groups, individuals and groups whose aim is sometimes genocidal and who
appear bent upon our destruction as a culture and as a nation.
We can protect ourselves from cataclysmic threats of this
sort. More important, we can do this and still maintain a fair
and objective application of Fourth Amendment doctrine that
respects our constitutional history. I really believe this. I do.
And now I'll tell you why.
It is critically important, of course, not to sacrifice our
constitutional heritage and constitutional structure to the perceived dangers of the moment. Just as the Constitution and the
Fourth Amendment apply with full force to the small-time
criminal (e.g., to the dope dealer, the burglar, and the car thief)
they also apply with full force to the big-time criminal (e.g., to
the murderer, the rapist, the kidnapper, and, yes, also to the
terrorist). Once we start down the road of carving out categories of people or categories of crime to whom, or with respect to
which, the full force of our Bill of Rights do not apply, we begin
sliding down the notorious "slippery slope," headed toward the
erosion of the rights of everyone, not just the "bad guys." This
we cannot do. As Chief Justice Rehnquist warned in a recent
book, it "is all too easy to slide from a case of genuine military
necessity ... to one where the threat is not critical and the
power [sought to be exercised is] either dubious or nonexistent."5 9

Indeed, the Supreme Court recognized and responded in
just this fashion to a similar slippery-slope problem when, in a

Prison in Iraq came to light. See, e.g., Josh White, Ex-Guard to Face More Charges, WASH. POST, June 9, 2004, at A16; Scott Higham, Joe Stephens & Josh
White, Dates on Prison Photos Show Two Phases of Abuse, WASH. PosT, June 1,
2004, at Al. If anything, what allegedly took place there, if true, only reinforces
the points made herein.
"' WILLIAM REHNQUIST, ALL THE LAWS BUT ONE: CIL LIBERTIES IN WARTIME
224-25 (Vintage Books 2000) (1998).
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1978 decision, it rejected the State of Arizona's attempt to
create a "murder-scene exception" to the ordinary search-andseizure rules dictated by the Fourth Amendment. ° Forget
warrants and probable cause and all of those onerous requirements, the State of Arizona argued, in essence, this was murder! 6'
The Supreme Court made it clear, however, that the fact
that a homicide had been committed, rather than some less
heinous crime, made no difference to the appropriate Fourth
Amendment analysis.6 2
[T]he State points to the vital public interest in the prompt
investigation of the extremely serious crime of murder. No
one can doubt the importance of this goal. But the public
interest in the investigation of other serious crimes is comparable. If the warrantless search of a homicide scene is reasonable, why not the warrantless search of the scene of a
rape, a robbery, or a burglary? "No consideration relevant to
the Fourth Amendment suggests any point of rational
limitation" of such a doctrine."'
Similarly, no consideration relevant to the Fourth Amendment suggests any point of rational limitation of a doctrine
that creates exceptions to normal Fourth Amendment doctrinal
analysis as applied to, for example, an individual who seeks to
plant a bomb in order to make a political point, in contrast
with an individual who seeks to plant a bomb in order to accomplish some purely criminal and entirely non-political goal.
In the USA Patriot Act (the 2001 "edition"),' Congress
enacted an extremely broad definition of "terrorism," including,
for example, violent acts intended "to influence the policy of a
Does this
government by intimidation or coercion....

"

Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 392 (1978).

63

Id.

63 Mincey, 437 U.S. at 392.
62 Id. at 393.

4 Uniting
and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115
Stat. 272 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.).
115 Stat. at 760. Notably, related language prohibiting the
6" § 802(a)(5)(ii),
provision of material support, including "expert advice or assistance" to designated
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broad definition mean then that Eric Rudolph, for example, the
accused Atlanta 2000 Summer Olympics bomber, is a "terrorist"?66 Or is he "merely" a "criminal"? Even if the Fourth
Amendment permitted such fine distinctions, does it make
sense to be more respectful of his constitutional rights if he is
deemed to be only a common thug, than if he intended to make
an uncommon political statement, planting his bomb to make a
point, however perverse and demented, through his violent
activity aimed at changing our national policy on abortions?
More important, can we be more respectful of Eric
Rudolph's constitutional rights in the former situation than in
the latter as a matter of law and still contend that we are applying the Fourth Amendment objectively? Remember Justice
Frankfurter's point that "[t is a fair summary of [our constitutional] history to say that the safeguards of liberty have frequently been forged in controversies involving not very nice
people."67
Furthermore, we have learned, or one would have hoped
that we have learned, the terrible lessons of Korematsu v. United States," when scores of people living in the United States,
many of them Japanese-American citizens, were interned,
"seized" in Fourth Amendment parlance.6 9 This occurred, of
course, at the beginning of World War II, out of stereotypic but
unproven fears of the possible complicity of these individuals
with a hostile power with which we were then at war. Such an

terrorist organizations was held unconstitutional by a federal court as void for
vagueness. Humanitarian Law Project v. Ashcroft, 309 F. Supp. 2d 1185, 1200
(C.D. Cal. 2004).
" See, e.g., Patrick Jonsson, How Did Eric Rudolph Survive?, THE CHRISTIAN
SCIENCE MONITOR, June 4, 2003, § USA, at 1; Daniel Levitas, Our Enemies At
Home, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 13, 2003, at A19; Michael A. Fletcher, At Home, Rudolph
Wins Sympathy; Distrust of Government Widespread in Area, WASH. POST., June
4, 2003, at A2; Edward Walsh, Ashcroft Weighs Where to Try Rudolph First: Atlanta, Birmingham Both Saw Deaths in Bombings, WASH. POST, June 2, 2003, at
A3.
", United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 68-69 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
"
323 U.S. 214 (1944).
6' Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 217; see Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81
(1943); see also Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633 (2004) (O'Connor, J., plurality opinion) (discussing Korematsu and its legacy).
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extraordinary response, essentially suspending or ignoring the
Fourth Amendment and other constitutional protections in
perilous times, even in times of legitimate and serious threats
to our national security, was not only not productive, it was
instead destructive of our constitutional fabric, and of our selfcongratulatory claims, trumpeted throughout the world, that
we are a nation of democratic virtues governed by the fair and
even-handed application of the rule of law.
As Justice Thurgood Marshall made the point,
[history teaches that grave threats to liberty often come in
times of urgency, when constitutional rights seem too extravagant to endure. The World War II relocation-camp cases and
the Red scare and McCarthy-era internal subversion cases"0
are only the most extreme reminders that when we allow
fundamental freedoms to be sacrificed in the name7 1of real or
perceived exigency, we invariably come to regret it. '

Moreover, it is arguably even more difficult to hold the
constitutional balance true when the most serious costs of our
government's response to the fear and the actual specter of

"o See, e.g., Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919); Dennis v. United
States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
7 Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 635 (1989) (Marshall,
J., dissenting) (citations omitted); see also Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. at 2635 (O'Connor,
J., plurality opinion). Justice O'Connor made a similar point in Hamdi, stating:
[Als critical as the Government's interest may be in detaining those who
actually pose an immediate threat to the national security of the United
States during ongoing international conflict, history and common sense
teach us that an unchecked system of detention carries the potential to
become a means for oppression and abuse of others who do not present
that sort of threat.
Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. at 2635 (O'Connor, J., plurality opinion); see also Rumsfeld v.
Padilla, 124 S. Ct. 2711, 2735 (2004) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("Unconstrained Executive detention for the purpose of investigating and preventing subversive activity
is the hallmark of the Star Chamber."); Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2, 125 (1866).
This idea was recognized as early as 1860, when Justice Davis explained that
[the Founders] knew-the history of the world told them-the nation they
were founding, be its existence short or long, would be involved in war;
how often or how long continued, human foresight could not tell; and that
unlimited power, wherever lodged at such a time, was especially hazardous to freemen.
Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. at 125.
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terrorism-costs like seizures and detentions on less than probable cause; prolonged, intensive and humiliating interrogations;
and, unfortunately, physical degradation, including torture-are costs that generally other people, not ourselves, must
bear. As the noted scholar and political commentator, Ronald
Dworkin, has reminded us,
[m]any Americans believe that.., the attacks on September
11 require (as it is often put) "a new balance between liberty
and security." That much-used expression suggests that we
can properly judge the new policies by asking whether they
are in our overall interest, as we might decide, for instance,
whether to strike a new balance between road safety and the
convenience of driving fast by lowering speed limits. But, with
hardly any exceptions, no American who is not a Muslim and
has no Muslim connections actually runs any risk of being
labeled an enemy combatant and locked up in a military jail.
The only balance in question is the balance between the
majority's security and other people's rights, and we must
think about that as a matter of moral principle, not of our
own self-interest.
...[The] strategy of putting American safety absolutely
first, a strategy that recommends any measure that improves
American security against terrorism even marginally or speculatively, or that improves the cost-efficiency or convenience
of America's anti-terrorism campaign, without counting the
harm or unfairness of that measure to its victims [is the]
strategy [we followed] in interning Japanese-Americans-the
benefit to security of that wholesale detention was minimal
and the damage it inflicted on its victims was enormous-and
we look back on that episode with great national embarrassment. Of course every government has a special responsibility
to look after its own citizens' safety, and a nation may, when
necessary, use violence in self-defense. But the harm it deliberately inflicts on others must be comparable to the harm it
thereby prevents to its own people, and when our government
shows itself ready to impose grave harm on foreigners or on
suspected Americans for only speculative, marginal, or remote
benefits to the rest of us, its action presupposes that their
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lives count for nothing compared to ours. 71

The question nonetheless recurs with a more modern twist.
Is the situation we face today somehow qualitatively different
from the perils faced by Americans in the past? Given concerns
of the stature and significance of the current genocidal threats
of terrorism, what weight, if any, does, or should, the seriousness of the crimes under investigation or the crimes feared to
be imminent, play in Fourth Amendment analysis?
In three very recent decisions, all three handed down in
the space of only a few weeks in the October 2003 Term, the
Supreme Court has begun to signal its answer to this question.
It is an answer, I think, that recognizes and accepts both of the
competing views I earlier described (i.e., that the Fourth
Amendment applies to everyone and that terrorism is different). And it is an answer, I also think, that sets the contours of
the way in which the Supreme Court will, and lower courts
must as well, deal with the terrorism-related Fourth Amendment cases that will eventually reach their dockets. To explain
the significance of these three recent decisions, let me begin
with a decision handed down three years ago.
In a 2001 decision, Atwater v. City of Lago Vista,73 a narrow five-to-four majority of the Supreme Court, in an opinion
authored by Justice Souter, ruled that the Fourth
Amendment's probable-cause requirement applies in precisely
the same way to all criminal offenses, whether they are major
or minor, grave or trivial.74 In fact, the Atwater Court specifi72 Ronald Dworkin, Terror & the Attack on Civil Liberties, 50 N.Y. REV. OF

BooKs, Nov. 6, 2003, at 37, 38 (emphasis added); see also HEYMANN, supra note
53, at 113 ("What we must do is assure than no one assumes the American people would willingly buy a small amount of increased safety in exchange for the
torture, detention, or imprisonment of innocents abroad.").
As long as others believe that the American people would willingly buy a
small amount of increased safety in exchange for the torture, detention,
or imprisonment of many innocents abroad, we cannot sustain any claim
to moral leadership. And moral leadership has served us well for decades
by eliciting popular support in nations around the world-i.e., in terms of
freely given support for the policies of the United States.
HEYMAN, supra note 53, at 126-27.
' 532 U.S. 318 (2001).
7' Atwater, 532 U.S. at 318.
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cally declined to craft any special Fourth Amendment rule for a
minor offender like the defendant in that particular case.75
That defendant, Gail Atwater, who, in the extensive media
accounts of the case, was commonly referred to as a "soccer
Mom" (and who may well have been a prom queen in her time),
was arrested and then dragged off to jail because she and her
two small children were observed by a police officer (who allegedly held a grudge against her) while she and her children
were driving in her pick-up truck without wearing their seat
belts.76
Not wearing a seatbelt is obviously not the same kind of
offense as hijacking an airplane or planting a bomb. But it is
nonetheless a crime in Texas, although a minor crime, punishable by only a small fine. Because it is a crime, minor or not,
the bare five-justice majority of the Court in Atwater sternly
admonished that
the standard of probable cause "applie[s] to all arrests, without the need to 'balance' the interests and circumstances

involved in particular situations.".

.

. If an officer has proba-

ble cause to believe that an individual has committed even a

very minor criminal offense in his presence, he may, without
violating the Fourth Amendment, arrest the offender. 7
In short, although she may have been just a no-seat-belt-wearing soccer Mom, at least in Texas, Gail Atwater was still a
criminal. And criminals, all criminals, minor or not, can be
arrested, and all criminals may be carted away to jail. To be
fair, the Atwater majority thought that she should not have
been taken to jail, but, nonetheless, it held that the State of
Texas, in its wisdom, could lawfully do this under the Fourth
Amendment.7"
Notably, however, Justice O'Connor, dissented in
9 Standing up for all of the criminal soccer Moms in
Atwater."

," Id. at 323.
I/d.

Id. at 354 (emphasis added) (quoting Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200,
208 (1979))."
78 id.
7' Id. at 360 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
"
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America, undoubtedly a sizeable group, Justice O'Connor argued, along with the three other justices in dissent, that Gail
Atwater's violation of a minor, "fine-only offense" like the Texas
seat-belt law, indeed justified her arrest, but it did not justify a
full-custody arrest.0 In other words, four justices took issue
with the Atwater majority's vision of an inflexible Fourth
Amendment, a Fourth Amendment that permits the government to make a full custodial arrest in any and all instances in
which any criminal law, however trivial, was broken.
Justice O'Connor reasoned as follows:
The majority insists that a bright-line rule focused on
probable cause is necessary to vindicate the State's interest in
easily administrable law enforcement rules. Probable cause
itself, however, is not a model of precision. 'The quantum of
information which constitutes probable cause-evidence which
would 'warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that
a [crime] has been committed-must be measured by the facts
of the particular case." The rule I propose-which merely
requires a legitimate reason for the decision to escalate the
seizure into a full custodial arrest-thus does not undermine
an otherwise "clear and simple" rule.
While clarity is certainly a value worthy of consideration
in our Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, it by no means
trumps the values of liberty and privacy at the heart of the
Amendment's protections."
Of course, this language was written in dissent. It did not
carry the day. But Justice O'Connor's point (i.e., that Fourth
Amendment probable-cause analysis is not clear and simple,
and that it does not, and should not, apply in precisely the
same fashion in every case, major or minor), would appear to
have been vindicated-albeit de facto, not de jure-in the unan82 handed down on Deimous decision of Maryland v. Pringle,
cember 15, 2003.
The Pringle decision involved the following facts. At 3:16

'0 Id. at 365-66 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
"z Id. at 366 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (quoting Wong Sun v. United States,
371 U.S. 471, 479 (1963) (citation omitted)).
8' 124 S. Ct. 795 (2003).
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a.m. on August 7, 1999, a Baltimore County Police officer
stopped a Nissan Maxima for speeding and because the driver,
just like Gail Atwater, was not wearing a seat belt.8 3 There
were three occupants in the car: the driver (who owned the
car); Joseph Pringle, who was a front-seat passenger; and a
third person, who was a back-seat passenger.8 4 The officer
asked the driver for his license and his vehicle registration. 5
When the driver responded by opening and reaching into the
glove compartment to retrieve his registration, the officer kept
his eye on him and observed a large amount of rolled-up cash
stuffed into the glove compartment.86
The officer then returned to his patrol car with the license
and registration to check the police computer system for outstanding violations.8 7 The computer check revealed that nothing was wrong and, as a result, the officer returned to the
stopped car, had the driver get out of it, and simply issued him
an oral warning.'
Now the plot thickens. While all of this was going on, a
second patrol car arrived, and the newly-arrived police officer
asked the driver if he had any weapons or narcotics in his
car.89 The driver said that he did not, and, rather stupidly, as
it turned out, consented to a search of his vehicle. 0 The
search turned up $763, which was the rolled-up cash that had
been viewed earlier in the glove compartment.9 1 More important, it also turned up five plastic baggies containing cocaine,
which were concealed behind the back-seat armrest.92 When
the second officer began his search, the armrest was in the upright position, flat against the rear seat.93 The officer pulled it
down and-voila!-found the cocaine, which had been stuffed
83 Pringle, 124 S. Ct. at 798.
'

Id.

05

Id.

at 798.

86 Id.
87

Id.

as Id.
as Id. at 798.
90 Id.
81

Id.

92

id,

93

Id.
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between the armrest and the back seat of the car. 94
The officer then questioned all three men about the ownership of the drugs and money, and he told them that if no one
admitted to owning the drugs, he was simply going to arrest
them all.9 5 Unsurprisingly, none of the men had the foggiest
idea where the drugs or money could possibly have come
from.96 All three men in Pringle were "shocked, simply
shocked," to discover that there were drugs in the car. Right.
Nonetheless, their protestations of innocence unavailing, all
three men were immediately placed under arrest and taken to
the station house.9 7
Later that morning, however, Pringle, the front-seat passenger, changed his story. 98 Waiving his Miranda rights, he
confessed.9 9 Pringle admitted that the cocaine belonged to
him, that he and his friends were going to a party with it, and
that he intended to either sell the cocaine there or Pringle,
obviously a real charmer, planned to "[ulse it [in exchange] for
sex."' O Pringle also maintained that both the driver and the
other passenger in the car had absolutely no knowledge of
these drugs, and, ultimately, in the absence of any additional
evidence, both of these other individuals were in fact released
by the police.1"'
Prior to trial, Pringle tried, unsurprisingly but unsuccessfully, to suppress his confession, arguing that it was the fruit of
an illegal arrest since the officers did not have probable cause
to arrest him and to take him into custody, where he subsequently confessed.0 2 The trial court rejected this argument,
ruling that the officers did in fact possess sufficient probable
cause to arrest Pringle."°3 Thereafter, he went to trial and a
jury convicted him of possession with one count of intent to dis94

Id.

95 Id.
96

Id.

97 Id.
98 Id.
99 Id.
100 Id.
101 Id.
102 Id.
103 Id.

at 799.
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tribute cocaine and one count of possession of cocaine. 114 He
was subsequently sentenced to ten years in prison without any
possibility of parole."0 5 The Court of Special Appeals of Maryland affirmed his conviction." 6
The seven-judge Maryland Court of Appeals, however, by a
narrow four-to-three margin, reversed the Court of Special
Appeals. ' ° The Court of Appeals concluded that, absent specific facts tending to show Pringle's knowledge and dominion or
control over the drugs, "the mere finding of cocaine in the back
armrest when [Pringle] was a front seat passenger in a car
being driven by its owner [was] insufficient to establish probable cause for an arrest for possession."0 8
As to the wads of money seen by one police officer and then
found by the other officer stuffed into the glove compartment,
the Maryland Court of Appeals ruled that although
[tihe State points to the additional fact that the police officer
saw a large amount of rolled up money in the glove compartment located in front of [Pringle, the presence of mioney,
without more, is innocuous ....

There are insufficient facts

that would lead a reasonable person to believe that [Pringle],
at the time of his arrest, had prior knowledge of the money or
had exercised any dominion or control over it. [A] police
officer's discovery of money in a closed glove compartment
and cocaine concealed behind the rear armrest of a car is

insufficient to establish probable cause for an arrest of a front
seat passenger, who is not the owner or person in control of
the vehicle, for possession of the cocaine."°9
As a result of this ruling, Pringle's drug convictions were
The United States Supreme
reversed. But, not for long.'
Court granted certiorari and, in December of 2003, it reversed

104
105

l0
107

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

" Pringle v. State, 805 A.2d 1016, 1027 (Md. Ct. App. 2002), rev'd, 124 S. Ct.
795 (2003).
,09 Pringle, 805 A.2d at 1028.
I at 1033.
Id.
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the decision of the Maryland Court of Appeals.' Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the Court, observed that "[iut is
uncontested in the present case that the officer, upon recovering the five plastic glassine baggies containing suspected cocaine, had probable cause to believe a felony had been committed. The sole question [remaining] is whether the officer had
probable cause to believe that Pringle committed that
crime. "112
In answering this question, the Chief Justice, who had
joined the five-justice majority in the Atwater decision, upholding Gail Atwater's custodial arrest for a minor, seat belt offense
in large part because of the supposed inflexibility of Fourth
Amendment probable cause, described in Pringle a rather more
malleable probable-cause analysis, concluding as follows:
The long-prevailing standard of probable cause protects
"citizens from rash and unreasonable interferences with privacy and from unfounded charges of crime," while giving "fair
leeway for enforcing the law in the community's protection"
On many occasions, we have reiterated that the probablecause standard is a "'practical, nontechnical conception.' that
deals with "'the factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, act .....[PIrobable cause is a fluid concept-turning on
the assessment of probabilities in particular factual contexts-not readily, or even usefully, reduced to a neat set of
legal rules."
The probable-cause standard is incapable of precise definition or quantification into percentages because it deals with
probabilities1 1 3 and depends on the totality of the circumstances.

Applying this "fluid" and open-ended conception of probable
cause, the Chief Justice then concluded for a unanimous Court:
In this case, Pringle was one of three men riding in a
Nissan Maxima at 3:16 a.m. There was $763 of rolled-up cash

...Pringle, 124 S. Ct. at 802.
1
Id. at 799 (citation omitted).
m Id. at 799-800 (quoting Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175-76
(1949); Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 231-32 (1983)).
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in the glove compartment directly in front of Pringle. Five
plastic glassine baggies of cocaine were behind the back-seat
armrest and accessible to all three men. Upon questioning,
the three men failed to offer any information with respect to
the ownership of the cocaine or the money.
We think it an entirely reasonable inference from these
facts that any or all three of the occupants had knowledge of,
and exercised dominion and control over, the cocaine. Thus a
reasonable officer could conclude that there was probable
cause to believe Pringle committed the crime of possession of
cocaine, either solely or jointly.""
Additionally, Chief Justice Rehnquist added that
[t]he Court of Appeals of Maryland dismissed the $763 seized
from the glove compartment as a factor in the probable-cause
determination, stating that "[mioney, without more, is innocuous." The court's consideration of the money in isolation, rather than as a factor in the totality of the circumstances, is mistaken in light of our precedents ....

We think it is abundant-

ly clear from the facts that this case involves more than money alone.'
Now recall for one moment Justice O'Connor's observation,
on behalf of the four dissenters in Atwater, that "[pirobable
cause ...

is not a model of precision. 'The quantum of informa-

tion which constitutes probable cause evidence which would
"warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief" that a
[crime] has been committed-must be measured by the facts of
the particular case.'""' 6 Compare the Chief Justice's observation for a unanimous Court in Pringle, handed down only two
years later, that "'probable cause is a fluid concept-turning on
the assessment of probabilities in particular factual contexts-not readily, or even usefully, reduced to a neat set of
' 1' 7
legal rules. ""
It would appear that, whatever the continuing validity of
.1.Id. at 800-01 (emphasis added).
115 Id. at 800 n.2 (citations omitted).
116 Atwater, 532 U.S. at 366; see supra note 81 and accompanying text.
..
7 Pringle, 124 S. Ct. at 799-800 (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 272
(1983)); see supra note 113 and accompanying text.
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the Atwater majority's analysis, which treated the Fourth
Amendment's probable-cause standard (for post-arrest custody
purposes) as static and unchanging whatever the facts and
circumstances in question, it is clear today that the Supreme
Court views probable cause through a somewhat more pragmatic and flexible lens, in the Court's words, as a '""practical,
nontechnical conception" that deals with 'the factual and pracreasonable and
tical considerations of everyday life on which
18
prudent men, not legal technicians, act.''
It is possible, of course, to distinguish Atwater from Pringle
by noting that the Court is unwilling to compromise the State's
authority to detain and/or search apparent small-time criminals (while noting at the same time the imprudence of engaging in such a course of action in cases like that of Gail
Atwater's), but the Court is willing to compromise the quantum
of certainty required before Fourth Amendment activity is
undertaken in cases where the apparent criminal conduct is
more serious, like, for example, Joe Pringle's trafficking in
cocaine.
But, in my view, I think Justice O'Connor simply "got it
right" in Atwater and that the Pringle decision demonstrates
why. A more significant showing beyond mere "probable-causethat-a-crime-any-crime-has-been-committed" should be required
under the Fourth Amendment before we permit the State to
blithely toss all the seat belt criminals and their soccer-Momish
ilk,-the evil litterers, for example, and their posses; the nefarious smokers huddled inside buildings criminally puffing away
in restricted areas, and their tobaccan enablers; the wicked jaywalkers and their misdemeanant henchmen-more should be
required than simply determining that there has been a violation of the law before we just let the State blithely toss them
into jail, assuming, as in Atwater, that the criminalizing state
has made clear the trivial nature of the offense by declining to
permit it to be punished by any term of incarceration.
In short, more should be required before the police are
entitled to make full custodial arrests. Bear in mind that, as an
incident of such custody, police possess the concomitant right to

"'

Pringle, 124 S. Ct. at 799-800 (quoting Gates, 462 U.S. at 231).
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use such intrusive investigative tools as prolonged detention
and/or strip and body cavity searches. A humiliating and seemingly punitive body cavity search of Gail Atwater would have
been very unlikely to have turned up a weapon, to put it mildly, or any evidence relevant to her criminal seat-beltless proclivities. There was not, after all, any question of whether or
where the seat belt had been hidden. 19
But, although I think he got it wrong in Atwater, where he

There is another reason why such an intrusive search should not be per"
mitted under the Fourth Amendment in minor cases like Atwater where there is
no reasonable belief that additional physical evidence may exist. At this time, the
reason does not command a majority of the Supreme Court, but it may well be
accepted by a majority of the Court in the near future.
In a decision subsequently handed down in the 2003 Term, Thornton v. United States, 124 S. Ct. 2127 (2004), a majority of the Supreme Court held that the
rule established in New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981), permitting a search
of the "passenger compartment" of a vehicle incident to the lawful custodial arrest
of an occupant, applies even when the searching officer does not begin to search
until the person arrested has already left the vehicle. Thornton, 124 S. Ct. at
2137. Justices Stevens and Souter dissented. Id. at 2138 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Significantly, however, Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Ginsburg, concurred
only in the judgment of the Court, taking the position that the Belton rule should
be "limit[ed] to cases where it is reasonable to believe evidence relevant to the
crime of arrest might be found in the vehicle." Id. at 2136 (Scalia, J., concurring),
A plurality of the Court-but only a plurality--disagreed with the Scalia position.
Id. at 2132 n.4. Justice O'Connor, who was the fifth vote for the majority result,
concurred in every part of the majority opinion except the portion rejecting
Scalia's position, adding that:
I write separately to express my dissatisfaction with the state of the law
in this area. As Justice Scalia forcefully argues, . . . lower court decisions
seem now to treat the ability to search a vehicle incident to the arrest of
a recent occupant as a police entitlement rather than as an exception . . . . That erosion is a direct consequence of Belton's shaky foundation. While the approach Justice Scalia proposes appears to be built on
firmer ground, I am reluctant to adopt it in the context of a case in
which neither the Government nor the petitioner has had a chance to
speak to its merit.
Id. at 2133 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
The upshot of these competing points of view is that there is some significant
chance, if not a likelihood, that in a future case, the Belton rule will be limited "to
cases where it is reasonable to believe evidence relevant to the crime of arrest
might be found in the vehicle." Id. at 2136 (Scalia, J., concurring). If such a new
rule applied to the hypothesized extension of the Atwater facts discussed in the
text above, a body-cavity search (and probably a strip search) would surely be held
to be unconstitutional.
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joined the majority, I think that Chief Justice Rehnquist got it
right in Pringle when he concluded for a unanimous Court that
the quantum of suspicion necessary to effect a Fourth Amendment encounter needs to reflect the necessity for "protect[ing]
'citizens from rash and unreasonable interferences with privacy
and from unfounded charges of crime,' while [providing law
leeway for enforcing the
enforcement, pragmatically,] with 'fair
1 20
law in the community's protection.'
Indeed, there is nothing either new or shocking about the
Pringle Court's recognition that the constitutional prerequisite
of probable cause prior to making an arrest (a "seizure" under
the Fourth Amendment) does not and should not require law
enforcement officers to possess proof of the ultimate facts in
question by a preponderance of the available evidence. The
classic example demonstrating this point of criminal procedure
is, oddly enough, often taken from the first Restatement of
Torts published in 1934, and it goes as follows:
A sees B and C bending over a dead man D. B and C each
accuse the other of murdering D. A is not sure that either B
or C did the killing, but he has a reasonable suspicion that
either121B or C killed D. A is privileged to arrest either or
both.
In other words, despite the fact that A cannot prove by a
preponderance of evidence that either B or C killed D at this
point in time, i.e., there is no proof of ultimate facts greater
than fifty percent, A is nonetheless still privileged to arrest
either, or both of them.
The Pringle Court cited this example and, similarly, held
that probable cause to arrest existed in Pringle because there
was significant and compelling evidence that all three occupants of the car were engaged in some sort of concerted activity, even though that fact could not be established, at that point
in time, by a preponderance of the evidence, let alone by the

120
"

Pringle, 124 S. Ct. at 799; see supra note 113 and accompanying text.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 119, cmt. j, illus. 2, at 198 (1965) (em-

phasis added); see also RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 119, cmt. j, illus. 2, at
254 (1934) (invoking the same example).
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beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard needed to convict them at
trial.'22 The three individuals' presence together in the car
late at night, the wads of money stashed in the glove compartment, and the presence of the cocaine packaged individually, as
if for resale and distribution, stashed covertly behind the armrest gave the arresting officers sufficient grounds to reasonably
believe that Pringle and the other two occupants of the car
were engaged in, at the very least, the joint possession of narcotics, if not in some sort of more serious ongoing drug sales
enterprise.12 3 The fact that none of the three could or would
offer an innocent explanation for his presence in the car did not
exonerate them all, but instead simply added to the suspicious
atmosphere. 24 Someone must have known how the cocaine
got there!
Moreover, the seriousness of the crime at issue, possible
drug trafficking, was clearly relevant to the Pringle Court's
Fourth Amendment probable-cause analysis.12 5 If, for example, the facts in Pringle had involved three individuals observed
in a no-smoking area, each standing next to a single burning
cigarette butt lying on the ground (signaling that someone had
clearly been smoking) but each of the three individuals, as in
Pringle, could not fathom how that criminal evidence got there
("I'm 'shocked' to find smoking here!"), it would appear to me
that, recognizing the necessity for "protect[ing] 'citizens from
rash and unreasonable interferences with privacy and from
unfounded charges of crime,' while giving 'fair leeway for enforcing the law in the community's protection,'" 2' there would
have been insufficient justification for making an arrest or a
search of any or all of these individuals, despite the Atwater
majority's professed (but now dated) disinclination to distinguish major from minor crimes.
But, this conclusion should and would change once again I
believe, when the smoking object on the floor is not a cigarette

" Pringle, 124 S. Ct. at 800-01.
124

Id.
Id.

125

Id.

123

" Pringle, 124 S. Ct. at 799; see supra note 113 and accompanying text.
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but transmuted instead into a smoking gun lying next to a
dead body, with three individuals standing around, professing
no knowledge whatever of what has occurred. In that case, it
appears to me-and I am certain that the Supreme Court
would agree, more certain than ever after Pringle, that there is
more than sufficient lawful and constitutional justification for
arresting any or all of these three individuals.
And the fact that I have argued that there was insufficient
evidence of probable cause in the smoking cigarette hypothetical does not mean, I would contend further, that the Fourth
Amendment has been applied in an inconsistent fashion when
probable cause is deemed to exist with respect to a more serious crime. The Fourth Amendment has simply been applied, in
the Supreme Court's phrasing, "practically," "nontechnically,"
and in a manner "that deals with 'the factual and practical
considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, act.'"'2 7
Let me add to this analysis a second recent Supreme Court
decision, even newer than Pringle, to reinforce this point. Let
me tell you about Illinois v. Lidster,12 s handed down by the
Supreme Court on January 13, 2004.
The essential facts of Lidster are as follows. On Saturday,
August 23, 1997, just after midnight, an unknown motorist
traveling eastbound on a highway in Lombard, Illinois, struck
and killed a seventy-year-old bicyclist. 129 The motorist then
3
1
simply drove, off into the night without identifying himself'
About one week later, at just about the same time of night and
at just about the same place on the highway, local police set up
a checkpoint designed to obtain more information about the
accident from the motoring public."3 '
A number of marked police vehicles, lights flashing, partially blocked the eastbound lanes of the highway.1 2 The
blockage forced traffic to slow down, leading to lines of up to
127 Pringle, 124 S. Ct. at 799; see supra note 113 and accompanying text.
128

124 S. Ct. 885 (2004).

.' Lidster, 124 S. Ct. at 888.
130 Id.
131 Id.
132 Id.
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fifteen cars in each lane.'33 As each vehicle drew up to the
checkpoint, an officer would stop it for ten to fifteen seconds,
ask the occupants whether they had seen anything happen
there the previous weekend, and hand each driver a flyer.'34
The flyer said "ALERT... FATAL HIT & RUN ACCIDENT"
and requested "assistance in identifying the vehicle and driver
in this accident which killed a 70 year old bicyclist."135 The
officer distributing the flyers did not ask for the driver's name,
license, or insurance information, nor did he or she ticket anyone for plain-view infractions like seatbelt violations.
Robert Lidster drove his minivan toward the checkpoint.136 But, just as he approached

the checkpoint, he

swerved suddenly, narrowly missing one of the officers who
was manning the checkpoint.'37 After jumping out of the way,
that officer approached the minivan to ask, reasonably enough,
why the driver had almost hit him.'38 When Lidster answered, the officer smelled alcohol on his breath and noticed
that his speech was slurred. 39 He then directed Lidster to a
side street where another officer administered a sobriety
test. "' When he failed the test, Lidster was arrested, and he
was subsequently tried and convicted in Illinois state court of
driving under the influence of alcohol.'
Lidster challenged the lawfulness of his arrest and conviction, inter alia, on the ground that the government had
obtained much or all of its relevant evidence of DUI as the
fruits of the use of a checkpoint stop that violated the Fourth
Amendment.' The trial court rejected this challenge.4 3 But
the intermediate Illinois appellate court reached the opposite
conclusion," 4 reversing Lidster's conviction, and the Illinois
133

Id.

134

Id.
Id.

135

136 Id.

137 Id.
138

Id.

139

Id.

140
141

Id.
Id.

142

Id.

Id.
1" Id.; see Illinois v. Lidster, 747 N.E.2d 419 (I.
143

Ct. App. 2001), affd, 779
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Supreme Court agreed with the appellate court.145
The Illinois Supreme Court held, by another one of those
narrow four-to-three votes that seem to flourish in this area of
the law, that the United States Supreme Court's 2000 decision
in the case of Indianapolis v. Edmond,' required the Illinois
court to find that Lidster's stop at a police checkpoint, made
without any individualized suspicion at all on the part
of the
1 47
unconstitutional.
was
checkpoint,
the
manning
officers
In Edmond, the Supreme Court had indeed previously
found another checkpoint unconstitutional, one at which the
Indianapolis police had stopped vehicles simply to look for
evidence of any possible drug crimes that might have been
committed by the occupants of those stopped vehicles. 148 After
stopping a vehicle at the checkpoint, police would examine
(from outside the vehicle) the vehicle's interior, walk a drugsniffing dog around the exterior, and, if they found sufficient
evidence of drug (or other) crimes, they would arrest the
vehicle's occupants .149 The Supreme Court found that police
had set up this checkpoint primarily for general "crime control"
purposes, i.e., "to detect evidence of ordinary criminal
wrongdoing."5 ° Accordingly, the Edmond Court held, since
these checkpoint stops were made entirely without any individualized suspicion of criminal conduct (just as in Lidster), the
checkpoints were unconstitutional.'5 1 The Fourth Amendment, the Edmond Court added, forbids such suspicionless
stops, in the absence of "special circumstances."" 2
But, despite Edmond, the Supreme Court in Lidster reversed the reversal of Robert Lidster's conviction by the Illinois
Supreme Court."5 3 Justice Stephen Breyer, writing for a ma-

N.E.2d 55 (Ill.
2002), reu'd, 124 S. Ct. 885 (2004).
'45 Lidster, 124 S. Ct. at 888.
'
531 U.S. 32 (2000).
Lidster, 124 S. Ct. at 888; see People v. Lidster, 779 N.E.2d 855 (Ill.
2002),
rev'd, 124 S. Ct. 885 (2004).
14" Edmond, 531 U.S. at 35.
149 Id.
Id. at 41.
...Id. at 44.
'50

162 Id.
'63 Lidster,

124 S. Ct. at 891.
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jority of the Court, reasoned that
[tihe checkpoint stop here differs significantly from that
in Edmond. The [Lidster stop's primary law enforcement purpose was not to determine whether a vehicle's occupants were
committing a crime, but to ask vehicle occupants, as members
of the public, for their help in providing information about a
crime in all likelihood committed by others. The police expected the information elicited to help them apprehend, not the
vehicle's occupants, but other individuals.
...
[U]nlike Edmond, the context here (seeking information from the public) is one in which, by definition, the concept of individualized suspicion has little role to play. Like
certain other forms of police activity, say, crowd control or
public safety, an information-seeking stop is not the kind of
event that involves suspicion, or lack of suspicion, of the relevant individual.
For another thing, information-seeking highway stops
are less likely to provoke anxiety or to prove intrusive. The
stops are likely brief. The police are not likely to ask questions designed to elicit self-incriminating information. And
citizens will often react positively when police simply ask for
their help as "responsible citizen[s]" to "give whatever
infor"1
mation they may have to aid in law enforcement. ) 5

As a result of this analysis, the Lidster Court reasoned
that while a suspicionless checkpoint stop is not usually constitutional, as the Edmond Court established only four years
previously, a suspicionless informational checkpoint stop could
be found to be reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, albeit
in the appropriate circumstances. 5 In this case, the Court
continued, the informational checkpoint stop was in fact reasonable and, hence, it was constitutional.'5 6 In Justice
Breyer's words,
[tihe relevant public concern was grave. Police were in-

Lidster, 124 S. Ct. at 889 (quoting Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 47778 (1966)).
"
Id. at 888-89.
1I

/d.
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vestigating a crime that had resulted in a human death. No
one denies the police's need to obtain more information at
that time. And the stop's objective was to help find the perpetrator of a specific and known crime, not of unknown crimes
of a general sort.
The stop advanced this grave public concern to a significant degree. The police appropriately tailored their checkpoint
stops to fit important criminal investigatory needs. The stops
took place about one week after the hit-and-run accident, on
the same highway near the location of the accident, and at
about the same time of night. And police used the stops to
obtain information from drivers, some of whom might well
have been in the vicinity of the crime at the time it occurred.
Most importantly, the stops interfered only minimally
with liberty of the sort the Fourth Amendment seeks to protect. Viewed objectively, each stop required only a brief wait
in line-a very few minutes at most. Contact with the police
Viewed subjectively, the contact
lasted only a few seconds ....
provided little reason for anxiety or alarm. The police stopped
all vehicles systematically. And there is no allegation here
that the police acted in a discriminatory or otherwise unlawful manner while questioning motorists during stops." 7
Note just how the Lidster majority applied the Fourth
Amendment. The Fourth Amendment applies to checkpoints,
all checkpoints, as they are all "seizures." But, the touchstone
of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness. And it was, the
Court concluded, wholly and entirely reasonable for the police
to use this sort of individualized-suspicionless, investigativecheckpoint technique as a matter of Fourth Amendment law
since: the public concern was "grave"; the information sought
related to a "specific and known crime, not... unknown crimes
of a general sort"; the police appropriately tailored their Fourth
Amendment activity to fit this important criminal investigatory
need; the activity interfered only minimally with liberty of the
sort the Fourth Amendment seeks to protect; and there was
neither evidence nor even an allegation that the police had
acted in a discriminatory or otherwise unlawful fashion."' 8

17

Id.

15 Id.

at 891 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
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As in Pringle, the seriousness of the crime at issue, inter
alia, was clearly relevant to the Lidster Court's Fourth Amendment analysis. It was a significant component of the reasonableness inquiry. Moreover, Pringle and Lidster are not the
only recent Supreme Court decisions that make it clear that
the application of the Fourth Amendment depends closely upon
the particular context in which the relevant law enforcement
activities arise.
In one last and also very recent decision, in United States
59
v. Banks,"
handed down on December 2, 2003, the Supreme
Court upheld the execution of a search warrant where the
executing officers delayed only fifteen to twenty seconds after
they had knocked on the search target's door and announced
their presence.160 Indeed, Lashawn Banks, who was inside,
could not get to the door in time to respond to the knock and
announcement, as he was in the shower when the officers
pounded on the door."' When the officers actually broke his
door down and rushed inside, they found Banks heading toward the front door to answer it, half-naked and dripping wet,
partially covered by only a towel. 6 ' In response to Banks' argument that a delay of fifteen to twenty seconds was an insufficient and unconstitutional period of time for an appropriate
delay under the knock-and-announce rules the Supreme Court
previously held required under the Fourth Amendment, 6 3 a
unanimous Supreme Court demurred.'6 4
Writing for the whole Court, Justice Souter observed, once
again, that the Fourth Amendment's key prescription is that of
"reasonableness."'65 And, in his words,
[a]lthough the notion of reasonable execution must therefore
be fleshed out, we have done that case by case, largely avoiding categories and protocols for searches. Instead, we have

1

124 S. Ct. 521 (2003).
"~ Banks, 124 S. Ct. at 523.
161Id.
162 Id.
"
'"

16I

See Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927 (1995).
Banks, 124 S. Ct. at 523.

Id.
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treated reasonableness as a function of the facts of cases so
various that no template is likely to produce sounder results
than examining the totality of circumstances in a given case;
it is too hard to invent categories without giving short shrift
to details that turn out to be important in a given instance,
and without inflating marginal ones. We have, however,
pointed out factual considerations of unusual, albeit not dispositive, significance."
It should not surprise you at this point that the sorts of
"factual considerations" the Court turned out to be talking
about in Banks are "practical" and "commonsensical" things
like the potential dangers posed to the executing officers by
failing to delay, or by failing to delay for a substantial period of
time, at the door and/or the reasonable possibility that undertaking such a delay might result in the destruction of evidence.
As the Court explained further, "the crucial fact in examining
[the] actions [of executing officers] is not [the] time [it would
take for an occupant] to reach [and answer] the door but the
particular exigency claimed." 67
Accordingly, the Banks Court concluded that
[o]n the record here, what matters is the opportunity to get
rid of cocaine, which a prudent dealer will keep near a commode or kitchen sink. The significant circumstances include
the arrival of the police during the day, when anyone inside
would probably have been up and around, and the sufficiency
of 15 to 20 seconds for getting to the bathroom or the kitchen
to start flushing cocaine down the drain. That is, when circumstances are exigent because a pusher may be near the
point of putting his drugs beyond reach, it is imminent disposal, not travel time to the entrance, that governs when the
police may reasonably enter; since the bathroom and kitchen
are usually in the interior of a dwelling, not the front hall,
there is no reason generally to peg the travel time to the
location of the door, and no reliable basis for giving the proprietor of a mansion a longer wait than the resident of a
bungalow, or an apartment like Banks's. And 15 to 20 seconds

1

Id.

at 525 (citations omitted).

Id. at 527.
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does not seem an unrealistic guess about the time someone
would need to get in a position to rid his quarters of cocaine.' "
Different facts, a different demonstration of exigency or the
lack thereof, would have led to a different result. Justice Souter
acknowledged this point readily enough, pointing out, for example, the obvious, namely that "[plolice [officers] seeking a stolen
piano may be able to spend more time to make sure they really
need the battering ram." 169 In short, Justice Souter was perspicacious enough to realize that the act of chopping up a stolen piano into slivers small enough to flush down the kitchen
disposal or the powder room toilet would take somewhat longer
than fifteen to twenty seconds. But, again, the real point of all
of this is that the application of the Fourth Amendment depends closely upon the particular context in which it applies,
including most particularly the gravity of the situation in
which the relevant law enforcement conduct arises.
With these three very recent Supreme Court decisions in
mind, let me return once again, and finally, to the question of
the Fourth Amendment's application in perilous times, its nature in the face of real or perceived threats of terrorist activity.
If law enforcement authorities reasonably believe that a
terrorist act is imminent, bringing explosives onto an airplane
in an attempt to hijack it, for example, it would appear to be
absolutely clear, bearing in mind, in particular, all of these
recent decisions, that the requisite antecedent justification
necessary (if any) to undertake law enforcement activity subject
to the Fourth Amendment must be assessed with full consideration of that grave and cataclysmic context. Indeed, the
Edmond Court had previously made clear, albeit in obiter dictum, that checkpoint stops that would otherwise be unconstitutional are nonetheless justified in "emergency" situations, including, the Court said expressly, presciently, more than a year
before the September 11th attack, checkpoints established in

'€

''

Id.
Id.

at 528.
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170
response to "an imminent terrorist attack."
We are simply not talking about unfastened seatbelts or
littering or smoking or piano thieves or drunk driving any
more. The Fourth Amendment should, the Fourth Amendment
must, be applied, again in the Pringle Court's words, "practically," "nontechnically," and in a manner "that deals with 'the
factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which
171
reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, act.'"
Our "everyday life" in 2004 includes, most regrettably and
tragically, but nonetheless "factually and practically," the specter of devastating acts of terrorist criminality raising the possibility of massive destruction and loss of life. The point is that
we can apply the Fourth Amendment consistently, objectively,
and fairly and still recognize the simple truth that some
threats are graver than others.
To recognize this plain and common sense fact of life is
not, however, to deny that the Fourth Amendment does and
should apply to law enforcement search-and-seizure activities
directed at everyone-anyone-suspected of committing a
crime, any crime. The Fourth Amendment does apply the same
to everyone. But, when the Fourth Amendment applies and
how the Fourth Amendment applies, are separate questions the
answers to which are, and must remain, extremely sensitive to
the circumstances in which particular Fourth Amendment encounters are utilized and the way in which those encounters
are made.
This is the point where the competing arguments about the
application of Fourth Amendment principles in perilous times
come together. The Fourth Amendment applies, it does and it
must apply if we are to respect our own laws and our own constitutional history, to every search and seizure (including arrests) made by American law enforcement authorities or their
agents. But, the Fourth Amendment does and must apply as
well in a way that includes unblindered sensitivity to and
awareness of the context in which the law enforcement activities in question arise. Indeed, it must apply in this way if we

"
7

Edmond, 531 U.S. at 44.
Pringle, 124 S. Ct. at 799.
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are to be able to respond appropriately and effectively to the
threats that now imperil us.
As Professor Heymann has reminded us,
the gravest danger to civil liberties and human rights emerging in the aftermath of September 11 is that leaders will
think we are without concern for non-citizens within the United States, indifferent to the welfare of people repressed by
despotic governments, prepared to accept without question
unequal treatment based on ethnicity, and unable or unwilling to see that there must be trade-offs even among our own
freedoms. An American people encouraged to earn the respect
for our traditions and values will be left with very hard choices. That is inevitable. But we should seek to make those
choices proudly and intelligently, and not out of fear and
anger alone.172
The current wave of terrorist threats to the United States
and to Americans and our allies is real; it is neither hypothetical nor imagined. The extraordinary scope of the potential
disasters portended by some of these threats is also real; it is
neither hypothetical nor imagined. In the course of the entire
American Revolution, 4435 Americans lost their lives. But in
one single terrorist attack, the attack on September 11, 2001,
more than 3000 individuals, Americans and citizens of other
countries, lost their lives in that one attack alone. When one
recognizes that terrorist individuals and organizations undoubtedly seek to obtain chemical, biological and nuclear materials to assist in their assaults, the possibilities for even more
dramatic loss of life are, of course, staggering and horrific.
These grave threats to us and to our nation and to our national
identity and character
are, sad to say, not likely to diminish
17 3
soon.
time
any
172

HEYMANN, supra note 53, at 113.

," The deaths of Osama bin Laden, and the next leader who takes his
place-and the next, and the next-and their followers, and the detentions of
hundreds or thousands of additional individuals who are merely suspected of
complicity will hardly diminish, let alone resolve, the root causes of terrorism. Cf.
HEYMANN, supra note 53, at xiii ("Terrorism is almost always the tactic of those
who feel powerless or purposely disempowered. Actions that restrain their dangerous activities are likely to increase their resentment at powerlessness or repres-
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Our response to such dire and dramatic threats should not
be, our response cannot be, to ignore our own history, to ignore
our own laws, or to ignore our own constitutional principles.
What sense does it make to jettison our Constitution in order
to preserve it, to ignore our own laws to uphold them, or to
abandon our integrity in order to save it? As the Supreme
Court opined in 1967, "lilt would indeed be ironic if, in the
name of national defense, we would sanction the subversion of
one of those liberties ... which makes the defense of the Nation worthwhile."17 4 Justice Stevens has more recently, sensibly declaimed, "if this Nation is to remain true to the ideals
symbolized by its flag, it must not wield the tools of tyrants
even to resist an assault by the forces of tyranny."1 7
Justice O'Connor made virtually this same point at greater
length in her recent plurality opinion in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld,
handed down in June of 2004, wherein the Court made it clear
that due process requires that American citizens designated
"enemy combatants" by the Executive Branch nonetheless retain their constitutional rights to a meaningful opportunity to
contest the factual basis for their detention:
Striking the proper constitutional balance here is of great
importance to the Nation during this period of ongoing combat. But it is equally vital that our calculus not give short
shrift to the values that this country holds dear or to the
privilege that is American citizenship. It is during our most
challenging and uncertain moments that our Nation's commitment to due process is most severely tested; and it is in those
times that we must preserve our commitment at home to the
principles for which we fight abroad. 7'

sion. Assassinating a terrorist leader may weaken management but, by creating a
martyr, help recruitment."). Muslim fundamentalists are not, of course, the only
groups who pose such a terrorist threat to Americans and American interests.
114 United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 264 (1967).
...Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 124 S. Ct. 2711, 2735 (2004) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
M7 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633, 2648 (2004).
The imperative necessity for safeguarding these rights to procedural due
process under the gravest of emergencies has existed throughout our constitutional history, for it is then, under the pressing exigencies of crisis,
that there is the greatest temptation to dispense with fundamental constitutional guarantees which, it is feared, will inhibit government action.
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Justice Scalia has similarly weighed in, underscoring the
point that the Framers of the Constitution well understood the
need to keep our constitutional balance true, even in extremis:
The Founders well understood the difficult tradeoff between safety and freedom. "Safety from external danger,"
Hamilton declared,
"is the most powerful director of national conduct. Even
the ardent love of liberty will, after a time, give way to
its dictates. The violent destruction of life and property
incident to war; the continual effort and alarm attendant
on a state of continual danger, will compel nations the
most attached to liberty, to resort for repose and security
to institutions which have a tendency to destroy their
civil and political rights. To be more safe, they, at
length, become willing to run the risk of being less free."
The Founders warned us about the risk, and equipped us
with a Constitution designed to deal with it.
Many think it not only inevitable but entirely proper
that liberty give way to security in times of national crisis-that, at the extremes of military exigency, inter arma
silent leges. Whatever the general merits of the view that war
silences law or modulates its voice, that view has no place in
the interpretation and application of a Constitution designed
precisely to confront war and, in a manner
that accords with
7
democratic principles, to accommodate it.1 7

The burden of upholding our Constitutional principles, our
laws and our liberties falls most heavily, of course, upon the
shoulders of our judiciary. It is rarely, if ever, the "popular"
thing to do to release a putative criminal, terrorist or piano
thief, even when the law commands it. But, as Judge Stephen
Reinhardt of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals recently concluded for that court, "even in times of national emergency-indeed, particularly in such times-it is the obligation of
the Judicial Branch to ensure the preservation of our constitu-

Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 165 (1963).
'
Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. at 2674 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
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tional values and to prevent the Executive Branch from running roughshod over the rights of citizens and aliens alike."178
This must be true for judges even if the cost of taking such
positions is not simply unpopularity, but more significant personal and professional costs as well. As James Otis remarked
of the calumny he faced when he resigned from public office to
take up the writs-of-assistance case for the Massachusetts Bay
colonists, "Itihe only principles of public conduct that are worthy [of] a gentleman ... are, to sacrifice estate, ease, health
and applause, and even life itself to the sacred calls of his
country. These manly sentiments in private life make the good
citizen, in public life, the patriot and the hero."' 79 Of course,
today, we recognize that such courageous virtues as those described by Otis are not solely the characteristics of loyal and
conscientious conduct by "gentlemen," lawyers and judges of
only one gender.
As former Chief Judge Patricia Wald of the District of
Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals, a "gentlewoman" who has
also served her country as a Judge of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia at The Hague, made
the point a number of years ago,
[we do not believe that strict enforcement of the fourth
amendment will cripple the police or preclude effective law
enforcement. Candor compels us to acknowledge, however,
that some crimes escape detection, and some criminals escape
punishment, as a result of our vigilant commitment to constitutional norms. Enforcement of these norms is not, on such
occasions, a pleasant duty; but it is a duty from which judges
may not shrink."°
As odd and discomfiting as it may be to hear it said like this, it
is nonetheless true that our American values are upheld and
our constitutional history is reaffirmed each and every time a
possibly guilty person is set free because evidence establishing
his or her guilt was suppressed by a court seeking to insure
...Gherebi v. Bush, 379 F.3d 727, 730 (9th Cir. 2004).
179 SMITH, supra note 19, at 316.
" United States v. Most, 876 F.2d 191, 201 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (emphasis add-
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that our Government and its agents respect and follow our
laws and our basic constitutional principles.
Professor Heymann counsels that "the challenge is not to
beat and stop terrorism. The trick is to do it in a way most
consistent with the values of a democratic society."' s To do
that, we need the courage out of convictions, a courage not
unlike that demonstrated by the young James Otis, a "flame of
fire" when he took on the establishment and sought to protect
and to vindicate our forefathers' and foremothers' basic human
rights by arguing against the writs of assistance.'8 2
At the same time, if less grandly, we need from our judges,
and from our leaders, we need more just-plain-good-old common sense. We need the common sense to realize the enormity
of the threats that face us, and we need the wisdom not to
respond to these threats in a partisan fashion or simply with
grand-sounding rhetoric, beautiful to the ear but insensitive to
the realities (and the strategic nuances) of the dangers that we
face. We need the wisdom and the common sense not to ignore
these threats when there is neither cause nor doctrinal obligation to ignore them, but while, simultaneously, preserving our
Fourth Amendment values and heritage.
Such a balancing act is, of course, a tricky one, and sometimes there will be elements of risk involved as well. But, fortunately, most criminal cases involving law enforcement officers'
Fourth Amendment activity do not involve terrorists. They do
not, thankfully, involve airplane highjackings or genocide or
jihad or suicide bombers. The corollary of a Fourth Amendment
reasonableness doctrine that permits us to consider the horror
and enormity of such crimes in assessing, for example, the
presence of probable cause to arrest or search as in Pringle, or
the power to make suspicionless checkpoint encounters as in
Lidster, or the amount of time necessary to delay after knocking and announcing with a warrant as in Banks, is that lawyers and judges (and policy-makers) must continue to respect
the value of preserving Fourth Amendment rights and our
constitutional traditions, even when it is painful to do so, even

18' See HEYMANN, supra note 53, at 159.
182 SMITH, supra note 19, at 316.
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when it hampers some overzealous activities undertaken by
law enforcement officers, actions that were genuinely and sincerely intended to fight crime ... and terrorism.
We can do this. We can respect individual rights and we
can protect ourselves, at the very same time, from the awful
threats that now face us.
Indeed, not only can we do this, it is, as Americans, just
precisely what we must do. We must keep the balance true, we
must keep the constitutional fire aflame even, perhaps especially, in perilous times.

